

The EU-Turkey Statement and Territoriality: human security, state security and domestic politics

La Sécurité: concept en droit et en politique des migrations

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1. Introduction

On the 18th of March 2016, the European Commission and Turkey have established the 'EU-Turkey Statement'¹ with the aim "to end irregular migration from Turkey to the EU" (European Commission 2016a). In accordance, irregular migration is presented as a threat to the 'public order' of the EU as an assemblage of nation-states. In the Statement, it is simultaneously argued that migrants' lives are saved and the inherent risks in flight reduced (ibid.). Hence, irregular migration is presented as a threat to the migrants themselves and a will to protect migrants through 'regularized' and 'secure' pathways is indicated (European Commission 2016c). The Statement is closely linked to the 'humanitarian crisis' in Syria and the increased number of refugees aiming to reach the EU.² The Statement is thus presented as a measure to "[address] the migration *crisis*" (European Commission 2016a, emphasis by author). In the Statement, there is a tangible unease with this crisis and the connection made with the increased influx of migrants into the territory of the EU. The exceptionality of the Statement is underlined in the document itself: "It will be a temporary and extraordinary measure which is necessary to end the human suffering and restore public order" (statement). The Statement offers an excellent platform for reflections on the coexistence of a discourse of human security and state security in order to shed light on the complexities of the 'migration-security continuum' (Bigo 2002: 63).

Hence, the statement indicates an interesting coexistence of preoccupation for the 'security' of migrants at the same time as emphasising the importance of preventing 'irregular' migration as a means for the well-being of the EU and its nation-states respectively. Hence, the EU-Turkey Statement allows analysing the coexistence of two security rationalities: on the one hand, an emphasis on individual security, framed as human security; and on the other hand, a more 'classical' conception of security, the one of state or societal security. We are able to observe, in Huysmans (2006: 29) words, "how different rationalities of security are playing into and against one another [...], how this interplay reconfigures security practices and what its implications are".

The overall aim of this paper is to analyse this coexistence. The "politics of (in)security" (Huysmans 2006: 146), which construct a specific understanding/picture of security, are scrutinised in this case with regard to the representation of migrants. This allows me to take part in the academic debate concerning the flaws of 'human security' literature as 'producing' victims instead of portraying active agents (Huysmans and Squire 2009). Particularly, I will

¹ Henceforward 'Statement'

² In the Statement this is stated as followed: "[the implementation of the Statement] aimed at both helping to alleviate the situation in Turkey and to meet the EU's commitment to provide legal pathways for victims of the Syrian crisis to settle in the EU" (European Commission 2016c).

focus on the diverging conceptions of these two rationalities of security by connecting it to the question of territoriality. Territoriality is a necessary consequence of the nation-state system, citizenship, its borders and the resulting conceptions of 'home' as spatially constructed (Brubaker 1992; Khosravi 2010; Walters 2004; 2010).³ Employing the question of territoriality not only reveals a specific set of logics and practices in migration politics, but also indicates important material consequences for migrants. Territoriality implies the centrality of the concept of 'framing' in defining threats and referent objects. In the present case, both, 'state' security and 'human' security, are divergently presented within or outside the EU. Importantly, the main 'measure' of the Statement is to send 'irregularly' arrived migrants⁴ back to Turkey, "in line with EU and international law, including the principle of *non-refoulement*" (2nd report, emphasis in original).⁵ Turkey is presented as a secure third country that allows the readmission of migrants.⁶ Territoriality and its defining character in relation to migrants and their 'security' occupies a central place in the analysed documents⁷ and represent the focus of this paper. This does not mean that other characteristics are not equally important or present. However, it means that territoriality as presented in these 'representative documents' allows to critically interrogate the link between the construction of the 'other' (as 'illegal' migrant) according to the territory of reference and in this specific case.

In accordance with these preliminary thoughts, my research question states as follows: How are the referent objects, that need to be securitised, and the threat to the respective referent

³ Due the space of this paper, I am not able to dive further into the meanings and consequence of the social construction of space in relation to the nation-state. But further reading that illuminates the dimensions of territoriality are found in Lefebvre (1991). In this paper Territoriality is used in its dimension as a reference to a specific territory of a nation-state. The nation-state in this sense is both a territorial and a membership organization (Brubaker 1992: 22).

⁴ Here, it is important to note that the emphasis is not on 'irregular' migrants per se. Instead it is indicated that reaching the EU 'irregularly' already makes the migrants inadmissible. In face of the lack of alternatives this is a rather sarcastic assumption.

⁵ The principle of non-refoulement is an international legal principal confining state sovereignty concerning the expulsion of a human being who is recognized as a refugee in accordance with the UN-resolution of 1951 (UNHCR 2016).

⁶ "The Commission has continued to support Greece by providing it with all the elements to conclude that Turkey is a safe third country and/or a country of first asylum within the meaning of the Asylum Procedures Directive for the purpose of returning to Turkey irregular migrants who had irregularly crossed into the Greek islands via Turkey as of 20 March 2016, under the terms of the EU-Turkey Statement." (European Commission 2016c). There are debates internal to the EU discussing this fact and other EU actors declaring Turkey as a state that is violating human and minority rights (Human Rights Watch 2016). This paper will not dive into the consequences and contradictions arising from this debate. But the existence of these contradictions clearly emphasis the contested and problematic character of the Statement.

⁷ For the present paper, four documents have been analysed: The EU-Turkey statement of 18.03.2016 (European Commission 2016a); the EU factsheet with questions and answers concerning the Statement (European Commission 2016b); the second report on the progress made in the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement (European Commission 2016c); and finally a document published by UNHCR on the legal considerations surrounding the statement (UNHCR 2016).

object represented in the EU-Turkey Statement in relation to the territory of reference? In tackling this question, I will argue that the territorial reference in connection to human security is deeply rooted in the nation-state system and its borders. Thus, instead of indicating a 'shortcoming' of the Statement, I will put forward that the underlying problem lies within the conception of 'us vs them' or 'inside vs outside' which is characteristic for the 'domopolitics' diagramming the current migration policies and politics (Walters 2004).

In order to shed light on this problem, I will engage with the conceptual framework of Buzan et al (1998) for the notion of security and the process of securitisation. Their conceptualisation includes three constitutive elements that drive securitisation: referent object, threat and measures to handle the threat to the referent object. Shortly introducing the main theoretical views of the present work and key conceptual instruments will allow to locate this paper in the wider literature on this subject. Thus, I will also locate myself in the debate of the broadening and widening of the security debate.

After having presented the EU-Turkey Statement, I will identify the referent objects, threats and exceptional measures as presented in the statement. This allows me to interrogate the coexistence of two security rationalities more closely, both of them with their own materiality. This part is concentrated on the different documents published by the European Commission concerning the Statement. Thus, my analytical part will contain these examples which are illustrated by theory from critical security studies and visa versa. In a next step, I will introduce the analytical concept of domopolitics in order to make sense of the identified security rationalities present in the statement. Thus, I will critically engage with literature that makes the link between security, migration and more specifically the link to the nation-state system. In the concluding part, I will recapitulate the findings and discuss certain limitations of the present analysis in the way of indicating future research possibilities.

2. The EU-Turkey Statement: Human Security, State Security and Domopolitics

2.1. Setting the ground: theoretical framework and premises

Engaging mainly with literature from critical security studies, it has to be said that the present analysis focuses on a representative document that envisage certain forms and contents and does not reflect reality. The analysis is located at a macro-level and I do not present an in-depth analysis of the creation of 'others', 'anti-citizens' or the dynamics involved in such a process. Rather, I point out how the 'security rationalities' are themselves extremely complex and heterogeneous. This implies different levels of construction, discourse and practice – which are not clearly separated. Thus, I am not elaborating the 'micro' security practices of a diversity of actors that influence each other and that lead to a broader security method (cf. Huysmans 2006: 152). Instead, I focus on the outcome of this diversity of security practices and rationalities in order to shed light on the consequences of such an outcome. Analysing this particular Statement allows to enlighten some underlying logics of the exclusionary practices resulting from borders and from the nation-state system. More concretely, the present analysis allows a first step in critically interrogating the coexistence of a humanitarian and a security discourse as two competing security rationalities that simultaneously play into each other (Huysmans 2006: 29). My theoretical goal is not to take security as a value to achieve, but rather as part of the problem itself: "Security policy [...] is not the answer but the problem" (Walters 2010: 219)

Doing justice to the security character of the Statement requires an analytical definition. Buzan et al. (1998) offer a comprehensive conceptual framework for understanding the process of securitisation. According to them, securitisation takes place "when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object [...]. The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them" (Buzan et al. 1998: 21). Security is about survival, or in Huysmans' (2006) words about 'freedom'. In a constructivist 'tradition', this conceptual apparatus allows identifying three preconditions and characteristics of the process of securitization. First, there must be the presence of a **threat**. Second, this threat endangers a **referent object**. And finally, there is the necessity to set (exceptional and prioritised) **measures** in motion (Buzan et al 1998: 36). It is important to note that in line with a constructivist approach, the presented (existential) threat does not necessarily represent a real threat. Rather, it is presented as such. Security in this sense becomes a self-referential practice (ibid: 24). Hence, this paper's focus is neither about clarifying the real existence of the threats, nor about the effectivity of the taken measures (although some commentaries are

inevitable). Instead, this paper is about illustrating the effects of presenting something as a threat to a specific referent object and in need of (extraordinary) measures.

Buzan, Weaver and Wild (ibid.), forming part of the 'Copenhagen School' with its 'broader agenda', have importantly contributed to a widening and deepening of the notion of security. Deepening implies a focus that goes beyond the 'classic' 'state-centred' position. Thus, referent objects have diversified from the nation-state over 'societal' security up to human or individual security. But in accordance with Buzan et al (ibid: 37) it is important to note that the security field is still commonly state-dominated. Thus, even though other referent objects are diagrammed as vital, there seems to be a hierarchisation of referent objects that favour the nation-state (Noll 2003). In the same way, the widening debate has led to an increased attention towards the construction of security threats in a diversity of 'security sectors'. Thus, military security vanishes as the main sector of analysis. Instead, other sectors such as the environment or migration gain focus of security analysis (Buzan et al 1998: 22f.).

In the present case, it is important to note that the securitization of migration in the context of the EU is not as straightforward as proposed by the conceptual framework of Buzan et al. (1998). Huysmans (2006: 150) argues for the case of the EU that it is "difficult to argue that threat definition is the heart of security framing". Instead, he (ibid.) proposes the concept of 'domains of security', which emphasizes the multidimensional character of security rationalities and its framing. 'Domains of security' thus questions the existence of "security sectors" (cf. Buzan et al 1998: 22f.) and contributes to a further widening of the security debate towards material factors on the basis of a 'security rationality' instead of a 'speech act' (Huysmans 2006: 150).⁸ Walters (2010: 220) talks in this context of a "material-semiotic turn" (cf. Bigo 2002) with the conviction that "we cannot confine our analysis to the planes of speech, symbolism and language" (ibid.). With this definition of securitisation, the meaning of security in the present case does not primarily depend on which referent object is predominant and which threat envisaged, but rather how the relative security practices changes according to the territory of reference. It depends on the "nature of the framing that security practice applies" and what the material effects are for migrants (Huysmans 2006: 16). Thus, I bring in the importance of other domains of security which in our case is 'human' security that envisions the individual as its referent object (Newman 2010). Instead of analysing how the security rationalities in this domain come into play (cf. Duffield 2001; Gupta 2008; Ferguson and Gupta 2002) which would go beyond the scope of this paper, I will analyse its coexistence with other security rationalities. In this view, humanitarianism which in normative ways has tried to

⁸ „Securitization is not a speech act but a multidimensional process in which skills, expert knowledge, institutional routines as well as discourses of danger modulate the relation between security and freedom" (Huysmans 2006: 153)

reframe the object referent from the state towards the individual gains weight (Khosler 2005, Newman 2003, Noll 2003, Shurke 2003). Thus, for the sake of coherence and simplicity, I will take human security as the rationality inscribed in this domain (leaving apart other economic and geostrategic interests and focusing on the act of representation).

Human security as a concept to deepen the notion of security and to propose the individual as the referent object instead of the state (Newman 2010) gained influence over the last years, especially with its focus on the connection between 'human security' and 'development' as a normative and policy orientated approach. Human Security becomes especially important in the context of so-called 'humanitarian' crisis (Noll 2003). Different logics of security seem to increasingly play "into and against one another" (Huysmans 2006: 29) as it becomes obvious in humanitarian interventions, as the EU-Turkey Statement takes part in. Huysmans (2006: 28) illustrates this in the case of "development aid in order to tackle so-called root causes of migration and terrorism" (ibid). Making sense of the presented problem comes from a specific understanding of studying (in)security and migration: "Gaining knowledge in unpacking the meaning of security, in the sense of analysing the specific security rationalities that are at play and the way in which they mesh into something different, would be a defining interest of such a field of study." (ibid: 29)

As a last theoretical point before moving to the analysis, I propose Walter's (2004) concept of domopolitics. Domopolitics sheds light on how the two security rationalities work against and into each other and how the outcome of this is shaped. With a foucauldian approach, Walters (ibid: 241, emphasis in original) defines domopolitics as follows: "If modern political economy echoes the project of government in the image of the household, domopolitics refers to the government of the state (but, crucially, other political spaces as well) as a *home*". Domopolitics plays with the positive meaning of home and the dangerous outside. This implies two different processes. On the one side, domopolitics confronts "the warm words community, trust, and citizenship with the danger words of a chaotic outside – illegals, traffickers, terrorists; a game which configures things as 'Us vs. Them'" (ibid.). But on the other side, domopolitics implies the conceptualisation of home with "a will to domesticate the forces which threaten the sanctity of home" (ibid: 242). Similarly, Noll (2003) shows how interventions have become an integral part of externalising problems of migratory movements and human mobility in general. As a consequence, the sovereignty of individuals and the sovereignty of other states are undercut. I will argue that the conception of home that arises from the concept of citizenship in the nation-state system has important implications for the Statement and helps to explain the coexistence of two referent objects – or security rationalities.

2.2 Referent Objects in the EU Turkey Statement

Analysing the representation of migrants in the Statement drives fast to some conclusive claims in connection to the territory of reference. First of all, it is remarkable how the Statement aims at clearly categorizing refugees according to delineating categories. These categories in turn define the refugee's appeal for certain measures, be it 'safe resettlement' to the EU or resettlement to Turkey as a 'safe country' or 'first country of asylum'.

A main instrument in applying these categories and at the same time 'guaranteeing' migrants' security in the domain of international law are the two principles 'first country of asylum' and 'safe third country' (European Commission 2016c). Both principles are based on the international human rights accords and the 'EU Asylum Procedures Directive' which preserves the 'principle of non-refoulement' (UNHCR 2016). Accordingly, a 'first country of asylum' is a country "where the person has been already recognised as a refugee in that country or otherwise enjoys sufficient protection there" (European Commission 2016b). A 'safe third country' on the other hand is a country "where the person has not already received protection in the third country but the third country can guarantee effective access to protection to the readmitted person." (ibid.). First of all, it becomes apparent that the security of migrants is dependent on the state's ability to provide them with sufficient means of protection. The provision of sufficient protection though is dependent on the 'categorisation' of the individual migrant as "not in need of international protection" (European Commission 2016a) in accordance with the "Asylum Procedures Directive" (ibid.). Taking into account the lack of possibilities to gain asylum on a legal way (Andersson 2016), the number of migrants given asylum in a 'legal' way is small and biased: "For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled to the EU" (European Commission 2016b). Strangely enough, nothing is written in the Statement about other nationalities or ethnic groups. This reinforces the impression mentioned above about the Statement being an exceptional measure in the context of the refugee crisis and mainly concerned with the ongoing conflict in Syria. Thus, the protection of different categories of migrants is strictly bound to territoriality: Syrians that are granted asylum on the grounds of the Statement and according to an admission scheme, will be able to enjoy the 'protection' of the EU, while the others "not in the need of international protection" and "arriving in Europe through 'illegal' routes" are perceived as being protected by Turkey. A main criterion is that the concerned refugee has not already tried to enter the EU via 'illegal' paths (second report). The admission to the EU will rely on a voluntary admission scheme by the countries of the EU, which up to now has not brought satisfactory results and no consequence is in sight among EU members (Human Rights Watch 2016).

Second, it is clear that the Statement aims to take into account the human rights aspect of international agreements and treaties (UNHCR 2016). In this sense, the Statement attempts a human security rationality as it becomes clear in the Statement: “[The] agreement targets the people smugglers’ business model and removes the incentives to seek irregular routes to the EU, in full accordance with EU and international law” (European Commission 2016b). Furthermore, it is stated: “In order to break the business model of the smugglers and to offer migrants an alternative to putting their lives at risk, the EU and Turkey today decided to end the irregular migration from Turkey to the EU” (European Commission 2016a). Their point of view is: “The clear message to migrants is that getting on a boat in Turkey, and endangering lives in the process, is not worth the risk given that there is a legal and safe pathway through resettlement” (European Commission 2016c). These quotes allow to make a first application of the conceptual framework of Buzan et al (1998). The referent object in the narrative of the Statement is clearly configured as the individual migrant who is threatened by “getting on a boat in Turkey”. This threat is posed by the sea and “smugglers’ business model”. The measure set in motion is the Statement itself that provides a “safe pathway” and protection outside the EU. What poses the migrants in peril is their ‘illegal’ mobility itself which has to be securitised and regularised. But once the territory has shifted, the narrative changes and the migrant is perceived as a threat to the public order on the basis of his mobility which has to be restrained. In this sense, it is the mobility of the migrant that makes him a threat; only an immobile migrant should be protected.

Concluding on the two points analysed, it is important to state that we not only find a hierarchisation of referent objects where the state (or public order) primes over (and guarantees) the individual security but moreover the focus shifts depending on the territory of reference: within or outside the EU. Thus, in a next step, I will turn to this problem by highlighting the analytical concept of domopolitics to illuminate the existence of two security rationalities and its consequences.

2.3. The EU-Turkey Statement and Domopolitics

“Homes are primarily sites of exclusion, not inclusion”
(Khosravi 2010: 95)

In order to offer an explanation for the coexistence of two security rationalities in the case of the Statement, I elaborate how the Statement takes part in the current diagramming of migration as domopolitics. Diagramming in this case is understood not only as a policy but as a specific set of logics and practices by taking into account the foucauldian notion of power as diffused, impersonal and dynamic (Walters 2004: 243). To tie in with the theoretical elaborations above: “One of the most significant features of the diagram of domopolitics is the equation it draws between security and the exercise of border controls over the movement of

people and goods which it grasps from the perspective of mobile risks” (ibid: 250). The interesting point for our case is that border control is not only presented as vital for “state sovereignty” (ibid.) but moreover for the ‘individual sovereignty’ (cf. Noll 2003); for the human security of migrants. Human mobility is depicted as an unease not only for the ‘nation-state’ but for the very individual migrant as well (Bigo 2002). I argue that the conception of home plays a crucial role in this rationality since it allows to analytically explain the divergence between the focus on human security inside and outside the EU. In the Statement, migrants are not only perceived as threatened by ‘illegal’ migration (especially with the demonization of “smuggler’s business” (European Commission 2016c)) but moreover, they are perceived as being better protected outside the EU.

The first implication of domopolitics is that home is perceived as endangered by the chaotic and dangerous outside. In our case this is primarily by the mobility of migrants which are perceived as ‘illegal’ and as posing a threat to the “public order”. In order to prevent this threat, more border control and cooperation with the Turkish coast guards and security apparatus is necessary. The illegal border crossing has to be eliminated or reduced drastically. Importance is given to the exchange of information, security knowledge, technology, and training of experts and border guards. The EU is willing to provide considerable funding in order to support the necessary implementations (European Commission 2016c).⁹ ‘Illegal’ migrants, in this case, are portrayed as “anti-citizen” and constructed as ‘immoral’ and ‘irresponsible’ (Khosravi 2010: 118). They “constitute a risk to the wellbeing, virtue, values and norms of society” (ibid: 116). ‘Illegal’ migrants are thus a threat to the ‘home’ (Walters 2004). The consequences are an illegalization of migrants resulting in the production of criminality based on a specific security rationality (Huysmans 2006). This is a way to create the ‘norm’ and reproduce and maintain a unified conception of the national identity of citizenry (Khosravi 2010: 115). In this sense, it is possible to confirm Bigo’s (2002: 67) statement that “migration is always understood through the categories of the national and the state, as a danger to the ‘homogeneity of the people’”. Again, this image is intimately connected to the picture of ‘home’ as invaded by an immigrant, portrayed as an outsider of the imagined state and society. The securitization of migration is thus based on the conception of the state as the natural container of a ‘homogenous society’ (Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Bigo 2002).

The second implication of domopolitics constitutes the will to ‘domesticate’ the dangerous outside that threatens ‘home’. Thus, apart from the will to keep the ‘undesirable’ outside, the

⁹ “ [...] emergency funding under the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund to increase the capacity of the Greek authorities to register new arrivals and to process their asylum claims. This funding will create better conditions for vulnerable migrants and strengthen the registration and asylum process with additional human resources, better IT infrastructure, increased availability of interpreters and better access to information.” (European Commission 2016c: 6)

Statement engages in a regularisation and domestication of the outside by keeping migrants in Turkey. Thus, the Statement envisions an active 'intervention' in another territory in order to preserve their 'sovereignty' and conception of 'home' (cf. Noll 2003). In line with this argument, the EU will engage in counteracting the 'humanitarian' crisis in Syria and engage in the ending of "human suffering" (European Commission 2016a). In turn, the 'real' refugees are presented as needy of protection and particularly vulnerable to the current crisis. Reading this from the perspective of domopolitics, the refugees outside the EU are not perceived as an active threat anymore but should be kept outside by means of protection through a humanitarian scheme and the Turkish government. The clear message is that endangering their lives on their way to Europe is not worth the risk and that sufficient protection would be given to them outside the EU territory. Making an 'illegal' journey will automatically condemn them to the being of an 'illegal immigrant'. The very essence of the 'humanitarian tradition' of the EU would be in peril if migrants are illegally entering the EU. The humanitarianism and the application of international law implies that these migrants are protected outside the EU territory. They attempt so, among others, by a "humanitarian implementation plan" and an "emergency social safety net" to provide a "robust protection framework for the most vulnerable refugees" (European Commission 2016c).¹⁰ In the same sense, three million Euros are funded for the domains of education, health, nutrition, and infrastructure in Turkey (ibid.). The cooperation by Turkey should by no means be conceived as voluntary and therefore be naturalised. Turkey's cooperation stems at least partly from the measures taken by the Statement that favour of Turkish interests in different domains unrelated to 'illegal' migration (such as economic integration or visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens). In the current climate of disfavour and critique of Erdogan's political strategy concerning human rights and minority protection, the Statement takes over an important factor in shaping the relations between Turkey and the EU (cf. Human Rights Watch 2016). Furthermore, Turkey occupies a key position in the EU's migratory policy interests thanks to its geographical location. The debates arising within the EU concerning the Statement and the relation to Turkey underlines the heterogeneity of public entities such as the EU. For instance, the Statement is not a legal accord but a statement that does not need approval from the European Parliament. Thus, the European Commission has unilaterally signed the statement; a sign of the 'exceptionality' of the Statement as a measure (cf. Zeotewej 2016). Apart from this short commentary, the situation illustrates how the EU takes exceptional measures in order to bring about a domestication of the mobility of people crossing from Turkey to Greece. Intervening outside

¹⁰ "Projects that will support refugees from Syria in Turkey have been launched and the EU is on track to contract EUR 1 billion by the end of summer. This will ensure that those who need international protection receive the support they require." (European Commission 2016c)

the EU territory and giving Turkey incentives to do so is a clear sign of 'problem shifting' and of 'paying' Turkey to limit human mobility seen as undesirable (cf. Noll 2003).¹¹

Since diagramming migration in terms of domopolitics implies the domestication of the dangerous outside, the EU relies on Turkey to domesticate the mobility of migrants who want to enter Europe. Hence, the Statement is not only about 're-bordering' which itself is a unique outcome of multiple logics and determinations (Walters 2004: 250). Moreover, it is about creating a 'safe space', a buffer zone, which prevents the penetration of home by the 'others'. In this sense, we're witnessing a de-territorialisation of borders. This is intermeshed with a humanitarian discourse which brings human security in line with development (cf. Koser 2005) or with state security (Huysmans and Squire 2009:6, see also Duffield 2001). While it would be possible to talk about 'humanitarian washing', the view applied here is that the focus on human security and 'humanitarian' interventions in the continuum between migration and security stems from the convictions and practical necessities of different actors and logics involved in the drafting of the Statement. A main problem of the consequences of the diagram of domopolitics and of the literature that favours human security consists in the fact that migrants are portrayed as voiceless victims who need protection by the state and in fact regular pathways: "Such strategic approaches [viz. human security] treat security as a value or condition that is affected by migration flows and, thus, by state policies to manage such flows" (Huysmans and Squire 2009: 4). Thus, I do not argue that the people involved in drafting the Statement are in favour of criminalizing mobility and demonizing the 'other'. Rather, the consequences are partly unintended outcomes that draw on the portrayed problematic 'nature' of mobility in the nation-state system as well as on the different micro security methods, and the diversity of actors at work (cf. Bigo 2002). What is problematic about this outcome is the portrayal of mobility (of the 'poor') as dangerous and the vulnerabilisation or criminalization of migrants in the process, based on the exclusionary conception of home and the consequential hierarchisation of perceived differences.

¹¹ It should be clear that the discussion of the role of Turkey in the drafting of the Statement is not the central part of this paper and therefore not exhaustive. Rather I discuss here the role of Turkey only as far as it imports for the analytical concept of domopolitics.

3. Conclusion: Towards a deterritorialisation of ‘citizenship’

“Only when home has vanished and humanity is no longer territorialized, only then, there will be a chance for humanity.” (Khosravi 2010: 96)

The analytical concept of domopolitics allows to shed light on the diverging character of the security rationalities applied in the Statement’s documents outside and inside the EU territory. The coexistence of these rationalities has been analysed as coming from the territorial conception of home, in this case the EU which is based on nation-states. This conception leads to a double process of preventing the sanctity of home by measures of keeping the dangerous ‘other’ outside and at the same time by intervening in the chaotic outside in order to domesticate the ‘forces’ that threaten the ‘sanctity’ of home (together with the scapegoating of smugglers for the human suffering). The consequences are, as elaborated above, the criminalisation of human mobility which in turn is based on the ‘ideal’ nation-state system and its conception of citizenship as a static and restrictive concept (cf. Brubaker 1992). This enables an analysis of the given case by viewing the state and the EU not as an entity but rather as “a collective illusion, the reification of an idea that masks real power relations under the guise of public interest” (Artexaga 2003: 400). A second implication is the victimisation of migrants outside the EU, who need to be protected by a state and given humanitarian assistance in order to keep them outside of Europe. It is the conception of home as a collective illusion and as powerful diagram that importantly explains the Statements focus on different security rationalities and the ‘tension’ thereof between ‘state’ and ‘human’ security. The consequences are the creation of a discourse to which not only the authority of truth is given to create the migrant as an “outsider inside the state” (Bigo 2002: 66). But further, it creates the image of the dangerous outside to where this ‘outsider’ belongs and where he has to be protected as a human being. As a consequence of this security rationality, migrants inhabit the juxtaposition of being both ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ depending on the territory of reference. Importantly, since mobility itself is illegalised, the migrant who lacks an alternative for reaching the EU and tries anyway is automatically ‘denaturalised’ and thus dehumanised.

Khosravi (2010: 122) writes that “citizenship has become the *nature* of being human”. Citizenship is not a right in itself. In this sense, the present paper is not about human rights which are based on the nation-state system but about “the right to have rights” (ibid.). “Humanitarians [human security advocates] fail to move beyond a security frame in which ‘undesirable’ migrants are either politicised as ‘threatening’ subjects or de-politicised as ‘vulnerable’ subjects” (Huysmans et Squire 2009: 7). Considering ‘illegal’ migrants as humans who question the underlying conception of citizenship and nation-state would be a welcoming alternative. Domopolitics is an attempt to “contain citizenship, to uphold a certain statist conception of citizenship in the face of social forces that are tracing out other cultural and

political possibilities. That Western societies are presently diagramming themselves in terms of domopolitics is not necessarily a sign of the strength of official definitions of citizenship, but perhaps of their weakness.” (Walters 2010: 256). Thus, migratory movements are themselves a form of citizenship questioning the current restrictive conception of citizenship as an instrument and object of social closure (Brubaker 1992).

This analysis was about how (in)security is presented in the Statement and how migrants are perceived either as voiceless victims or as threats to the illusionary society contained by ‘nation-states’. Nevertheless, this analysis stays at a very macro-level and has to be acknowledged as such. It is not an ethnographic research which would allow to shed light on the dynamics that are triggered by the implementation of this statement and in the encounters and negotiations of the terms of enactment. Such a study would help to nuance the picture of the ‘migrant’ and of mobility and to counteract hegemonic narratives which are currently present in the public. Andersson (2016) shows in his ethnographic enquiry along the external EU-border of Spain, how the current migration regime with its emphasis on border control leads to a criminalisation of migration and mobility. He (ibid.) shows how these measures lead to the outcome that migrants have to search for ever different routes to enter Europe and that the borders cannot be hermeneutically closed (see also Petrillo 2016). Such studies illustrate how migrants ‘illegality’ is only a way of humans to circumvent the ‘boxes’ established by the current migration policies. Furthermore, they illustrate how the resulting policies are ineffective even in their own definitions. Another example is Khosravi’s (2010: 5) ‘auto-ethnography of borders’ where he shows how policies, laws and public narratives are lived and experienced. Such works are in my view essential in counter-acting the simplistic representation of migrants in the current debates on migration.

In this line is my final argument. While I do believe that it is important to make theoretical claims about the migration-security nexus, I do also believe that often such analyses are alienated from the actual experiences of migration. Thus, I do think that the present analysis helps to critique and shed light on the implications of the Statement and the current diagramming of migration in terms of domopolitics. But at the same time, I argue that closer insights of the ‘migrant’ experiences are necessary in order to counteract the dehumanizing tendencies of the current narratives on ‘illegal’ migration. Furthermore, such studies enable us to paint a nuanced picture for the causes of migrant’s death and ‘human suffering’ along Europe’s border. These are much less likely smugglers than the migration policies and agreements themselves. Claiming this, I end with a citation of Walters (2010: 219):

“[Recognizing] that the security perspective, deeply institutionalized as it is in this apparatus of control and advanced by innumerable vested interests, actually obstructs and marginalizes the space in which other imaginations and a different politics of migration might take shape. Security policy, in other words, is not the answer but the problem”

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