Commonalities and Specificities in Mega-Event Securitization: The Example of Euro 2008 in Austria and Switzerland

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This chapter draws upon empirical insights into security governance at the 2008 European Football Championships in Switzerland and Austria (hereafter “Euro 2008”). My objective is to explore the commonalities and specificities in the securitization of Euro 2008 in the event’s two host nations and eight host cities. The paper also looks into the interactions and interdependencies between local, national and transnational stakeholders and their motivations in security governance at sport mega-events.

This research problem covers a large and complex field of investigation. In recent years, the various forms, effects and problems of trans-scalar collaboration in security governance have been acknowledged both from a general perspective (e.g. Power 2007; Amoore and DeGoede 2005) and from the viewpoint of mega-event securitization more specifically (Samatas 2007; Klauser 2008). These studies have provided insights into the normative weight of best practices provided by security professionals moving from country to country, and from event to event (see Boyle 2011). They have shown local stakeholders to be increasingly exposed to globalized networks of expertise that are helping to reproduce previously tested collaborations and templates in security matters. These arguments are summarized in Samatas’ study of the external pressures and “policy penetration” (Bennett 1991: 228) in security matters at the 2004 Athens Olympics:

Athens, protected only by traditional security provisions, was not initially deemed reliable to host the post-9/11 Summer Olympics. Greece had to build an international security alliance and buy the latest security and
surveillance technology made in the United States and the European Union to get support and confidence. (Samatas 2007: 222-3)

There are many good reasons for understanding sport mega-events as highly visible and prestigious projects, whose securitization is firmly embedded in more or less coercive transnational circuits of imitation and standardization. In this approach, however, the role of local agency, motivation and expertise in security governance should not be underplayed, or ignored completely.

My paper emphasizes precisely this issue. In what follows, I am interested in differentiating the understanding of mega-event securitization as an externally driven, high-profile operation. Based on empirical insights into the securitization of Euro 2008 in Switzerland and Austria, I advance a number of preliminary arguments regarding the degree of autonomy and maneuverability of national and local stakeholders in the field of mega-event securitization.

The chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part briefly outlines the methodological approach, particularities and special appeal of my case study. The second part investigates five main developments in contemporary security governance at sport mega-events: the technologicalization, militarization, commercialization, globalization and standardization of security/surveillance. Specific examples are cited to illustrate how these developments were reflected in the security “dispositif” (Foucault 2009: 11) for Euro 2008. On this basis, I seek to highlight some of the general forces and processes contributing to the recurrent commonalities in the field of mega-event securitization. At the same time, these examples also point towards the existence of important national and local variations in the securitization of Euro 2008,
Thus underlining the value of particular national and regional characteristics, agencies and motivations in shaping security governance at mega-events.

The third section adds a local dimension to this discussion. Focusing on the host city of Geneva, I locate the issue of mega-event securitization in the context of a specific range of projects, whose realization was driven by complex interactions and coalitions of interest between local, national and transnational stakeholders. Security governance at Euro 2008 was hence conditioned not only by an array of transnational developments and processes, but also by specific national characteristics and a range of local desires and agencies in security/surveillance matters.

My study draws upon empirical insights provided by a two year research project relating to the securitization of Euro 2008 in Switzerland and Austria. Facilitated by longstanding research collaborations, my research involved ten in-depth interviews with diverse stakeholders in the securitization of Euro 2008 in Geneva. These stakeholders included the security coordinator of the Euro 2008 stadium in Geneva, security personnel at Geneva International Airport, representatives from the Ministry of Justice in Geneva, the city’s security coordinator and police personnel. Furthermore, the research has relied on the extensive study of official documents (minutes of local executive and parliament sittings, executive responses to local, regional and national parliamentary debates, and official documents from police sources and UEFA) and on information gathered from various local, national and international media.
My analysis of Euro 2008 draws predominantly on information collected in Switzerland. Austrian examples relating to the securitization of Euro 2008 are considered only with a view to highlighting specific national differences in the securitization of these events.

PARTICULARITIES OF EURO 2008

The European Football Championships are generally regarded as the third largest recurrent sport mega-event in the world (Stadtpolizei Zürich 2007a). Unlike other mega-events such as the Olympics or G8 summits, Euro 2008 affected not just one urban site, but a network of eight host cities in two countries: Basel, Berne, Geneva and Zurich in Switzerland; and Innsbruck, Klagenfurt, Salzburg and Vienna in Austria. Using Euro 2008 as a case study thus offers ideal conditions to investigate how both local and national approaches to security/surveillance may differ for the same event.

By way of further contextualizing the Swiss case study, two particularly important characteristics of Switzerland are worth emphasizing: Switzerland’s position as a non-EU member state on the one hand, and its internal federalism on the other. It is safe to assume that both characteristics not only shaped the organizational structures at Euro 2008, but also facilitated the emergence of specific local and national differences in the event’s securitization.
Switzerland’s non-EU membership

Staging Euro 2008 in a EU member state (Austria) and a non-EU country (Switzerland) raised important questions with respect to security collaboration between the host nations (Public Authorities Security Sector Coordination UEFA EURO 2008 2007: 50). As early as 2003, the two countries had signed a ministerial declaration on intensified cooperation for Euro 2008. Towards that end, a joint working party on security was established to review various critical issues, ranging from the experiences at earlier sport mega-events to the legal framework for implementing joint measures (Public Authorities Security Sector Coordination UEFA EURO 2008 2007: 49). Despite these efforts, however, security collaboration between Switzerland and Austria was further complicated by the fact that before Euro 2008, Switzerland had not implemented the EU Schengen agreement on European cross-border police cooperation (Schweizerische Depeschen Agentur 2006).

According to several Swiss government reports (e.g. Public Authorities Security Sector Coordination UEFA EURO 2008 2007: 17), the specific challenges arising from Switzerland not being a member of the EU were countered by a range of either pre-existing or specifically crafted arrangements with participating, neighboring or transit countries. For example, a temporary visa agreement was signed between the Schengen nations and Switzerland: the border between Austria and Switzerland remained a border between an EU member state and a non-EU country (thus with border controls in place), but no specific Swiss visa was required for fans from participating Schengen countries. This special arrangement also included a temporary
agreement that border controls would be staffed by mixed teams from both countries (Amies 2008).

Thus in many ways, Switzerland’s non-membership of the EU resulted in a range of special arrangements and solutions for Euro 2008. However, it should not be forgotten that Swiss-European security collaboration at high-risk events had been tested before on several occasions, such as at the G8 meeting in Evian near Geneva in 2003, and the annual World Economic Forum in Davos.

**Federalism**

The second Swiss particularity to emphasize goes back to the country’s internal federalist structure, which designates a particularly high degree of autonomy to the regional (cantonal) and local (municipal) level. At least two major implications of Swiss federalism are worth mentioning here.

Firstly, Swiss federalism increased both the complexity of internal security coordination for Euro 2008 in general, and the scope for diverging regional/local security solutions more specifically. For example, the novel security technologies for Euro 2008 appealed to the political authorities on no less than three geographic scales: the host cities, the cantons, and the confederation (Fürst 2007: 16).

Secondly, Swiss federalism provided many different channels for critical political engagement with Euro 2008. In the local parliaments of the four Swiss host cities,
staging Euro 2008 gave rise to a myriad of political debates. Whilst these debates did not question the viability of Euro 2008 as a whole, they in many ways affected specific local solutions regarding a wide range of event related issues, including security. I will cite three examples. In Zurich, residents and local shopkeepers, widely supported by conservative parties, challenged (in part successfully) security related road closures around fan zones. In Bern, Euro 2008 raised more fundamental concerns. There, debates focused mainly on the costs, the controversial militarization of public safety, and the commercialization of public space during the event. The city’s budget for Euro 2008 (5.6m Swiss Francs) was subjected to a public vote held on 17 June 2007. Although a 52.4% majority of the voters confirmed the city’s original budget, the narrow result was seen as supporting the opposition’s position. In Winterthur (a non-host city of Euro 2008), on 25 November 2007, 56% of the population voted against the city’s plan to stage official public viewing of the event. On different levels, in different places, on different scales, and for different reasons, Euro 2008 was subjected to a variety of more or less politically institutionalized pressures and debates. Assessing the commonalities and specificities of security governance at Euro 2008 must therefore also acknowledge the direct and indirect effects of these more local, political and popular engagements.

DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITY GOVERNANCE AT SPORT MEGA-EVENTS
In recent years, security and surveillance at sport mega-events have been subjected to repeated academic scrutiny. Although there continues to be a lack of truly empirical and comparative work in this field, these investigations allow us to understand security governance at sport mega-events as the result of, and the catalyst for, a broad set of developments, ranging from processes of technologicalization, militarization and commercialization to the increasing globalization and standardization of security/surveillance matters. It is worth exploring these developments briefly with a view to the securitization of Euro 2008. My aim here is not only to highlight the existence of important general trends (commonalities) in security/surveillance at mega-events, but also to shed light on some national and regional variations of these trends that were evident at Euro 2008.

The technologicalization of security/surveillance

Recent work underlines the role of sport mega-events as test sites for increasingly complex high-tech surveillance applications (Samatas 2007; Boyle and Haggerty 2009; Yu et al. 2009; Giulianotti and Klauser 2010). The illustrations below confirm the importance of sophisticated novel security technologies at Euro 2008.

The deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for crowd control in Swiss host cities is a prime example (Stadtpolizei Zürich 2007b). Since 2005, UAVs have been used in Switzerland to monitor traffic, natural disasters and national borders. Yet the policing of Euro 2008 marked an unprecedented urban centered application of UAV in the country.
Interestingly, the use of UAVs for urban policing was not allowed in Austria (Österreichischer Rundfunk 2008a). It should also be noted that during Euro 2008, UAVs were employed to monitor only three of the four Swiss host cities. In Geneva, the proximity of Geneva International Airport precluded using drones in the city. Here we see national variations in security governance at Euro 2008, as well as the role played by local (in this case urban) characteristics in shaping event security.

The mobile fingerprint identification system bought by the Swiss police provides a second illustration of high-tech surveillance at Euro 2008. This device was publicized as a logical enhancement to the existing stationary fingerprint identification system used at Swiss border checkpoints (Österreichischer Rundfunk 2008b). In Austria, in contrast, no such technology was used during Euro 2008. This example thus again underlines the autonomy of national decision makers in event security. Furthermore, these differences raise a critical question regarding the measures’ proportionality. National differences in the securitization of Euro 2008 were not due to differing risk assessments in the two host nations, but resulted from the countries’ socio-political contexts, security governance and the motivations for surveillance.

Other novel security measures at Euro 2008 included RFID-based access control systems for stadia, as well as additional CCTV and new police communication technologies in some host cities (both in Switzerland and Austria). I will return to these examples in the last part of this paper, with a view to the securitization of Euro 2008 in Geneva.
Commercialization of security/surveillance

Euro 2008 created a range of major business opportunities for companies that provide security related labor forces, advice and technology. In Switzerland, approximately 3,500 private security personnel (provided by a consortium of private security companies for Euro 2008) spent a total of 25,000 working days to secure team hotels, training grounds, stadiums, public viewing events, and other sites (Projektorganisation Öffentliche Hand UEFA EURO 2008: 49).

Regarding the importance of private expertise in providing, designing, and managing security/surveillance installations at Euro 2008, the following account, taken from my interview with Geneva’s coordinator of stadium security for Euro 2008, is typical:

We are constantly approached by companies trying to sell stewarding or security. Other companies attempt to sell geo-localization, helping to localize agents, etc. There are also companies selling high performance radio-communication systems, headphones … everything. Eventually, we are approached by sellers of fences, access systems, etc. […] We’ve taken time to discuss with some of them […] For example, there was somebody, commissioned by several Israeli companies, offering a whole range of services and technologies. I haven’t met this particular person, but I’ve sent him towards other colleagues. We can’t meet everybody; we’ve got to concentrate on the essential. (Security coordinator, Geneva Football stadium) [Personal interview 14 February 2008; my translation]

This quote reveals the intense marketing and lobbying strategies employed by private companies longing to help securitize sport mega-events. Yet it also sheds light on the
authority of local decision makers to decide which people to meet, which information
to obtain and which problems to prioritize. The quote thus draws attention to both the
standardizing forces inherent in the lobbying activities of private security companies,
and the autonomy of local authorities who have some scope to choose the providers
and solutions that best meet their needs.

**Militarization of security/surveillance**

Security/surveillance at mega-events can also be placed within the wider context of
“new military urbanism,” a term that designates the spread of military techniques and
militarized definitions/organizations of urban space, particularly in the context of the
War on Terror (Graham 2010).

At Euro 2008, for example, UAVs were supplied by the Swiss Air Forces’ industry
partner *RUAG Aerospace*, and operated by the army’s *Drone Squadron 7* in
collaboration with civilian personnel at the military airbase in Emmen (Schweizer
Arme 2008). Fifteen thousand military personnel were deployed for Euro 2008 in
Switzerland – from the air forces, infantry, military security, sanitary services, and
communication services – making the event the biggest military deployment in
Switzerland since World War Two (Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft 2007). In
Austria, 3,000 military personnel worked at the event (Österreichisches Bundesheer
2008), which also saw the policing debut of Austria’s new *Eurofighter Typhoon*, an
air fighter developed by the European Consortium *Eurofighter Gmbh* in the UK, Italy,
Germany and Spain (Hoyle 2008).
It should also be noted that neither Austria nor Switzerland (which are not members of NATO) followed the example of the 2006 FIFA World Cup and the 2004 Athens Olympics (both hosted by NATO member states) in deploying NATO AWAC airplanes for aerial surveillance, which further underscores the relationship between national politics and mega-event securitization.

**Globalization of security/surveillance**

Sport mega-events provide an exemplary illustration of the globalization of social risks and security threats—such as terrorism, hooliganism and organized crime (Jennings and Lodge 2009)—and of the globalization of security partnerships, norms and agreements. In 1990, Switzerland ratified the “European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehavior at Sporting Events” (Council of Europe Convention SR 0.415.3), which promoted the exchange of information and police cooperation for sport events. For Euro 2008, Switzerland had concluded a range of additional *ad hoc* agreements with neighboring, transit and participating countries. Interestingly, several agreements written up for earlier events could be recycled for Euro 2008 (examples include the international treaty for air defense with France, signed for the 2003 G8 summit in Evian near Geneva, and the air defense agreement with Italy, established for the 2004 Turin Winter Olympics). These examples reinforce the point that sport mega-events can be catalysts for more enduring international security collaborations (e.g. Chan 2002).
As was the case during the 2006 FIFA World Cup, the Euro 2008 host cities ensured that foreign fan groups were accompanied by police and fan monitors from their own countries. In addition, Switzerland asked France and Germany to supply up to 1,000 police officers (a total of 5,250 working days) to increase its police contingent for Euro 2008 (Projektorganisation Öffentliche Hand UEFA EURO 2008: 50). Finally, it is important to acknowledge the strong collaboration between public security authorities and Euro 2008 SA (the official organizer of the event, as a subsidiary company of UEFA). Indeed, security in stadia and official UEFA fan zones was delegated to Euro 2008 SA, which accomplished this task by contracting with private security companies (Public Authorities Security Sector Coordination 2007: 47). In studying the commonalities and specificities in security governance at sport mega-events, therefore, it is necessary also to consider the important role played by the event organizers (UEFA, FIFA, IOC, etc.).

**Standardization of security/surveillance**

The previous sections suggest that security governance at Euro 2008 resulted from complex coalitions of authority and expertise linking together multiple public and private, local, national and international security players. While acknowledging these complexities and interactions, I wish to now stress the weight of globally calibrated best practices in security governance at mega-events.

Perhaps the most obvious example of such standardization relates to the organization of so-called public viewing events, i.e. specifically designed and enclosed “fan zones”
where supporters of different nations could drink and party whilst watching the matches on giant television screens. Closely monitored by CCTV cameras, private security agents and police forces, these pre-defined perimeters concentrated fans and helped regulate social life during the World Cup. The concept had its breakthrough at the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany, which marked a step change in the large-scale restructuring of event cities into spatially extended fan zones (Schulke 2006). The organization of public viewing zones has since become a bid requirement for both FIFA World Cups and European Football Championships (UEFA undated).

Thus, hosting mega-events implies accepting a series of more or less coercive norms and mechanisms, which help reproduce previously tested and subsequently standardized templates. Further examples include specific policy handbooks and guidelines (such as the “2004 EU Handbook on securing against terrorist acts at major sporting events”), standardized norms and procedures from the bidding process to the staging of the event, progress monitoring by the organizing bodies, and also a range of more informal mechanisms facilitating “institutional learning” and “fast policy transfer” (Peck and Theodore 2001; Boyle this volume) from event to event (technology fairs, expert conferences, exercises, etc.).

Although I mentioned earlier the commercialization of security/surveillance in sport mega-events, it is important to reiterate the role of private companies in standardizing security governance at sport mega-events. By way of example, consider the following Siemens advertising copy:

Siemens delivers complete infrastructure solutions for major sport events all over the world. Examples are the Olympic Games 2004 in Athens, the Asian
Games 2006, the European Soccer Cup 2004 in Portugal or the Soccer World Cup 2006 in Germany, where Siemens equipped all twelve stadiums with latest technology. In Portugal various Siemens Groups bundled application knowledge and synergies in the field of sport infrastructures and contributed most advanced technologies to nine of the ten stadiums.

(Siemens 2007)

This quotation is a telling testimony of the role and responsibility of private companies, who travel from place to place and from event to event with pre-established plans and designs (exemplars), thus pushing towards increased imitation and policy convergence.

LOCAL SPECIFICITIES IN MEGA-EVENT SECURITIZATION: THE HOST CITY OF GENEVA

My discussion has so far highlighted some of the general trends (commonalities) in security governance at sport mega-events. These examples also shed light on the various regional and national expressions of these trends. I now turn my attention to the host city of Geneva, in order to accentuate how the securitization of Euro 2008 responded to specific local projects and motivations. My investigation focuses on three examples: stadium security, the renewal of Geneva’s radio communication network and the extension of CCTV in Geneva’s city center. These examples allow me to further examine the reasons for local variations in the securitization of Euro 2008.
Stadium security

As mentioned previously, stadium security at the European Football Championships was mandated to Euro 2008 SA. Constructional, technical, organizational and operational security aspects in and around the event stadia thus fell under the authority of UEFA (Public Authorities Security Sector Coordination UEFA EURO 2008 2007: 46). In Geneva, for example, UEFA’s “Binding Safety and Security Instructions” not only prescribed that novel access control measures be used (including RFID and X-ray technology) and that fallow land surrounding the stadium be reallocated, but also provided detailed instructions for stewarding, house rules, and so on (Viot et al. 2009).

The example of stadium security also testifies to the relationship between UEFA instructions and locally anchored motivations in security matters. The following quote from the security coordinator of the Geneva Football stadium helps to make this clear:

Thanks to Euro 2008, many things have changed around the stadium. For example, there was this building we wanted to disappear for years, which is now being demolished. […] Beneath the building, installations for hooligans and delinquents are being built. Suddenly, money was made available to do this. So this will remain afterwards. This is something the police had wanted from the beginning, but never managed to get. Now, with Euro 2008, bingo, it’s alright. Myself, I’ve also submitted a proposal for new radios. Quite a few things on the technical and material level will remain in place (Security
coordinator, Geneva Football stadium). [Personal interview 14 February 2008; my translation]

Considering that UEFA instructions prescribed the installations for hooligans and the reallocation of fallow land surrounding the stadium, thus constituting a common feature in all event stadia, the above quote shows how external security directives fused with longstanding demands from police and stadium personnel. Stadium security during Euro 2008 resulted from a complex set of initiatives that were more or less standardized and coercively guided by UEFA, yet also more or less actively initiated and propelled by local stakeholders. Specific decisions resulted from processes involving a range of actors, guided by converging goals, acting from mutually enhanced positions and driven by shared benefits, but also pursuing their own specific agendas and personal projects. The security coordinator’s proposal for new radios, a personal initiative for a specific local security solution, is a particularly telling example.

These interactions and interdependencies not only shaped stadium security during the event, but also had an impact on its long-term ramifications, as we see from the security coordinator’s mention that some of the changes made in and around the stadium would remain after Euro 2008. Although this conclusion is worth pondering—other security measures were removed after the event, such as X-ray machines for access control—the quote provides an initial glimpse into the security legacy of Euro 2008. Only by recognizing the interactions between transnational, national and local actors can we understand the long-term effects of security governance at sport mega-events.
Radio communication

Compared to stadium security, efforts to renew Geneva’s radio communication network for safety and security organizations (known locally as the project “Polycom”) touches on issues of much larger scale and complexity. I shall here examine the relationship between Polycom and Euro 2008.

Polycom is a nationally coordinated and subsidized project that aims to integrate the various cantonal radio systems in Switzerland into one unified communication network. The project intends to link all public safety and security organizations on the national, cantonal and municipal level (Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz 2009: 1-2). The national objective is for all cantons to be operational by 2012. Given the number of parties co-financing the project (including the confederation, the 26 Swiss cantons, the affected municipalities and others), the renewal of each sub-system must also be approved by the relevant cantonal parliament.

In Geneva, policy documents on Polycom (cost estimates, statements from relevant authorities, minutes of commission meetings, etc.) have recently been declassified, thus allowing for a study of the project’s relationship with Euro 2008. The Geneva Finance Commission’s report, outlining the reasons for adopting Polycom on June 13th 2007, is particularly revealing:

It should be noted that security […], which will affect the image of our canton in the media worldwide, was present in the mind of the members of the Finance Commission. Security depends on this type of equipment,
allowing the networking of all partner authorities and organizations in security and health. In an attempt to provide equipment to the police in an extremely short period, Bill 9901 (allocating the budget for a feasibility study) was quickly dropped. Instead, Bill 10034 (allocating the budget for the project itself) was presented urgently to the Grand Conseil [Cantonal Parliament] on June 14th. Despite the bill’s indication on page 16/32 that project planning probably wouldn’t allow the running of Polycom in its totality at Euro 2008, we hope that a financial effort of this type (15,266,715 Swiss Francs), agreed in these difficult times, would be more than enough to encourage the Grand Conseil to do everything possible to assure a maximal use of this new system during the football matches. (Grand Conseil de Genève 2007: 1; my translation)

For several reasons, the quote above is hugely suggestive. First, it provides ample evidence of the association of Polycom with Euro 2008. Because of Euro 2008, the project had to be adopted “urgently” and without a feasibility study. “Everything possible” was to be done in an “extremely short period” to assure Polycom’s “maximal use” at the event. That Polycom was facilitated and accelerated through Euro 2008 is obvious.

Second, the quote indicates that security governance at mega-events strongly interacts with more or less emotionally and/or rationally driven local motivations and concerns. Although more detailed investigation would be required to show exactly how the urgency and unavoidability of Polycom was discursively constructed, the quote exemplifies that the interrogation of the commonalities and specificities of mega-event securitization must also be oriented around questions relating to the complex
socio-political dynamics unfolding locally from the event’s catalyzing forces.

Given the national importance of the project, it is almost certain that Polycom would have been adopted even without Euro 2008, but there is good reason to believe that the debates would have been very different and the decisions much slower. The pre-assessment of Polycom in 2006 by the treasury’s Finance Inspectorate raised a series of financial concerns, was critical of Polycom’s total dependence on Siemens—the exclusive supplier of the network and of its terminals—and questioned the need to replace Geneva’s radio system (renewed in 2000 for 10.6m Swiss Francs) after just seven years of service (Inspection Cantonale des Finances 2006). In the context of Euro 2008, such doubts were quickly set aside.

Third, as with the example of stadium security, the quote above also tells us something about the legacy of Euro 2008. As we see, Polycom was never expected to be fully operational at Euro 2008. In fact, Geneva police did not start acquiring Polycom radios until December 2009, one and a half years after the event (Office fédérale de la protection de la population 2010: 2). Thus, in reality, Polycom was nothing but a legacy. In principle, however, this “delay” could hardly have come as a surprise, given that it took three years to install Geneva’s previous radio system (Inspection Cantonale des Finances 2006) and that transferring the police to Polycom was also combined with a large-scale restructuring of the canton’s emergency response and security management system.

Ultimately, Polycom also tells us something about the regional and local specificities in security governance at Euro 2008. During the event, it is interesting to note,
Polycom was used by the police in Bern and Basel, but not in Geneva and Zürich. In Austria, an altogether different radio communication system was employed.

**Police CCTV**

My third example relates to the project known locally as “Cyclops,” which provided the police with an additional thirty three video surveillance cameras for use in Geneva (worth 4.7m Swiss Francs). Again, my discussion will be informed by policy documents relating to the discussions and reviews of the project by the Geneva Parliament and its relevant sub-committees.

Cyclops was to have two main video surveillance applications. Twenty five of the cameras were expected to monitor diverse diplomat sites across Geneva. The other eight were intended for city center squares “at risk” and explicitly related to Euro 2008.

The objective is to install Cyclops cameras for Euro 2008, at least in the identified problem areas. If data protection legislation is approved in time for the event, the legal framework will be in place for this operation. If not, the parliament will take provisional decisions until the law is voted definitely. (Grand Conseil de Genève 2008: 4-5; my translation)

This quote provides a good starting point for considering some of the event related logics underlying the implementation of Cyclops. The example again underlines the catalyzing force of Euro 2008: Despite the absence of relevant (cantonal) data protection legislation — another implication of Swiss federalism, which requires video
surveillance by *cantonal* police to be based on an adequate *cantonal* legal basis (Müller and Wyssmann 2005) — Cyclops had to be approved urgently in preparation for the event. As an aside, it is interesting to note that the Geneva parliament only passed this legislation on October 9th 2008, three months after Euro 2008, and that the law did not come into force until January 1st 2010.

In order to further underscore how Euro 2008 facilitated Cyclops, it is revealing to look into the minutes of the Finance Commission’s meeting on December 19th 2007, during which the project budget was allocated by 9 to 4 votes (1 abstention). The official statements reveal that four of the nine members of the commission who approved this measure explicitly justified their position with reference to the exceptional needs of Euro 2008 (Grand Conseil de Genève 2008: 6-7). Consider the official party line of Geneva’s socialist group:

> In principle, the socialist group is not in favor of this project. […] The group agrees with those people that are worried about the surveillance of individuals. However, it is important to accept this bill because of Euro 2008. (Grand Conseil de Genève 2008: 6-7; my translation)

The statement highlights the party’s dilemma with respect to Cyclops. It is not clear, however, why its members did not opt for a temporary video surveillance system, an option which was debated briefly in the commission and was adopted in the host city of Basel (Justiz- und Sicherheitsdepartement Basel-Stadt 2008). Cyclops was always presented as a permanent solution in Geneva, a fact that underlines both the security legacy of Euro 2008 and the existence of important local variations in event securitization.
Although policy debates on Cyclops resembled those surrounding Polycom in terms of the event’s catalyzing force, a series of important differences must be noted. Firstly, unlike Polycom, Cyclops prompted serious debate in the parliament’s Finance Commission, in the parliament itself, and in Geneva more generally. In part, this debate can be explained by the relative skepticism towards CCTV and the marked privacy concerns in Switzerland (Klauser 2006). More importantly, however, the project was harder to justify because it was neither nationally coordinated (as for Polycom) nor imposed by UEFA (as in the case of stadium security). Cyclops was driven primarily by local concerns.

In sum, whilst the previous examples of stadium security and Polycom illustrate respectively how UEFA stipulations fused with local demands and motivations, and how Euro 2008 helped to facilitate the local implementation of a nationally coordinated project that would have been constrained in normal times, Cyclops shows that Euro 2008 also worked as a triggering mechanism to facilitate local security projects that were justified in terms of their local benefits both during and after the event.

**CONCLUSION**

This chapter has attempted to move beyond an understanding of local security stakeholders at sport mega-events as passive recipients of externally imposed authoritative orders. In contrast, security governance at Euro 2008 was positioned within a complex field of agencies, driving forces and motivations, including a range
of international processes and stipulations, as well as diverse national and local predispositions and impulses in security matters.

On the one hand, this chapter has emphasized the weight of transnational security players, who move from place to place and event to event with predefined plans and solutions that push towards increased imitation and policy convergence. It has also examined the impact of best practices, and of instructions from the event’s organizing bodies (UEFA, FIFA, IOC, etc.), with a view to explaining some of the recurrent commonalities in mega-event securitization. On the other hand, the paper has provided several examples (from Switzerland’s drones and mobile fingerprint identification technology to Austria’s Eurofighter Typhoons) that indicate important differences in the securitization of Euro 2008 between its two host nations/eight host cities. These examples also point towards the maneuverability of national/local stakeholders in event securitization.

From the perspective of the host city of Geneva, the chapter has shown how external security instructions fused with local motivations and demands (in stadium security), and how Euro 2008 triggered and facilitated projects and developments driven by various interests and agencies both nationally (Polycom) and locally (CCTV surveillance). The exceptionality of the event further increased the weight and perceived importance of particular security projects, whilst at the same time decreasing the scope for criticism and opposition. The examples hence bear striking testimony to the capacity of mega-events to trigger the financing of new constructional, technological and securitizing projects, a point that is powerfully confirmed by research on other mega-events (e.g. Tomlinson 2009: 100).
Based on these examples, the chapter outlines how socio-political, cultural and other particularities of host nations/cities interact with broader trends and developments in security governance at sport mega-events. It also underscores the need to apprehend mega-event securitization as a combination of processes and projects that bring together various public-private, local, national and transnational actors whose positions are defined by interwoven interests and concerns.

Of course, the specific insights gained from this case study might differ in other host cities of other mega-events. For example, interviewees repeatedly emphasized that local stakeholders in security governance enjoy much greater autonomy at the European Football Championships than at events such as the Olympics (which are marked by heavy American involvement and exposed to heightened international pressures). Case by case, from event to event, interactions and relationships between local, national and international security stakeholders vary significantly in terms of the actors, strategies, interests, instruments, and stipulations. Indeed, a central challenge for future research into mega-event securitization will be to undertake detailed and comparative empirical investigations into how different types of events, in different cultural contexts, both resemble and differ from each other.

Such studies will pave the way to a better understanding of the logics and legacies of mega-event securitization and, in addition, may also lay the basis for a critical engagement with security governance at mega-events in terms of the proportionality of the measures employed. In the case at hand, the existence of diverging approaches and dynamics in security matters within the host nations and cities of Euro 2008
underscores the scope for such debates. Policy learning at mega-events should not focus only on the supposed benefits of the measures employed, but also on the possibilities of and benefits from not employing certain security measures and particularly intrusive surveillance technologies.

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